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Some Effects of Physician Licensing 
Requirements on Médical Manpower 
Flows in Canada 
Malcolm C. Brown 
In this paper the author examines the implications of 
the licensing régulations of physicians in Canada. 
There seems to be gênerai agreement among economists that the 
médical profession, in most capitalist countries, has managed to effec-
tively monopolize the markets for médical services.1 In one way or 
another the profession has managed to limit the number of médical 
practitioners by control over licensing procédures and régulations. Thus 
it increases the average income of the remaining practitioners by moving 
up the demand curve for médical services and also créâtes an économie 
climate conducive to the maintenance of the monopoly. Physicians are 
willing to refrain from compétitive behaviour, such as price cutting and 
advertising, because the profession restricts numbers of practitioners suf-
ficiently to guarantee ample business for ail without such behaviour. 
Licensure controls can take a variety of forms. A favourite procé-
dure of professions is to require an excessive, and increasing standard 
of training as tirne passes, for new entrants to the market.2 This allows 
practitioners to obtain an increasing I BROWN, M.C. Associate Professer, I 
amount of quasi-rent on their educa- Department of Economies, Universi- I 
tional investment throughout their | ty of Calgary, Calgary, Alberto. j 
* I would like to thank Professor Jan Adam for comments on the paper. He 
is, of course, not responsable for remaining errors. 
1
 See Reuben A. KESSEL, « Price Détermination in Medicine, » Journal of 
Law and Economies, vol. 1 (October, 1958) pp. 20-53 and D.S. LEES, Economie 
Conséquences of the Professions, Institute of Economie Affairs, London, 1966 for 
gênerai discussions of the issue. For further views of this author on the subject see 
Malcolm C. BROWN, « Medicare and the Médical Monopoly ;>, The Canadian 
Forum, April, 1974, pp. 5-9. 
2
 D.A. DODGE, « Occupational Wage Differentials, Occupational Licensing, 
and Returns to Investment in Education : An Exploratory Analysis », S. OSTRY 
(éd.) Canadian Higher Education in the Seventies, Ottawa, Information Canada, 
1972, p. 147. 
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careers.3 It also reduces the possibility of new practitioners engaging in 
compétitive practices to attract clients since they are always the highest 
cost producers in the market. Another procédure is to vary the pass 
rate on the licensing evaminations according to the need (as defined by 
the profession) for new practitioners.4 A final possibility is to engage in 
discriminatory practices with respect to foreign practitioners — for 
example, more stringent licensing requirements for foreigners than for 
locals. Discriminatory policies against immigrants are always relatively 
easy to défend politically and are therefore attractive to use if économie 
objectives can be achieved through them.5 
The Canadian médical profession has appeared to stress the first 
and last methods of control more than the second. In the postwar years 
formai educational requirements for Canadian médical students hâve 
increased continually, with much of the increase difficult to défend in 
ternis of guaranteeing technical compétence.6 Accompanying the in-
creased training requirements for Canadian trained doctors has been 
increasingly stringent licensing régulations for immigrant doctors. 7 How-
ever, neither the licensing requirements for immigrant doctors, nor chan-
ges in them, hâve been homogeneous across Canada. Because of differing 
économie conditions the provincial médical associations — responsible 
for most médical policies including those on licensing8 — hâve not been 
able to corne to complète agreement on the standards to be used for eva-
luating immigrant doctors. The problem is that the licensing standards 
preferred by an organisation like the Ontario Médical Association would 
create a severe doctor shortage if implemented in Newfoundland. Large 
sections of the province would hâve few, or no, practicing physicians with 
such severe barriers of entry to the market. Consequently Newfound-
3 Ibid. 
4
 See Alex MAURIZI, « Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest », 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 82, no. 2, March/April, 1974, pp. 399-413 for 
an analysis of the use of this technique in the United States. 
5
 Immigrants hâve in gênerai no way of bringing discrimmatory policies to 
the public attention. Even if they could it is doubtful that, as a foreign group, they 
would get much sympathy and support. Thus, controlling supply through limiting 
the number of immigrant workers is a preferred technique by any occupational 
monopoly. 
6 D.A. DODGE, op. cit., p. 155. 
7
 Canadian Médical Association Journal, vol. 108, January 6, 1973, p. 96. 
8
 Because the British North America Act makes health a provincial matter 
ail médical policies must be implemented through provincial bodies. 
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land has adopted lower licensing standards than Ontario. In gênerai, the 
différences in licensing régulations specified by the provincial médical 
associations hâve affected the distribution of immigrant physicians among 
Canadian provinces. 
The variation in provincial licensing standards has apparently been 
a source of some difficulties for the médical profession. Dr. W.G. Mc-
Clure, head of a Fédération set up by the médical profession to increase 
uniformity in licensing requirements, has described the situation in the 
following way : 
This gives rise to a situation where a practitioner may practice for 
some years in one part of the country but not be eligible for licensure 
in another. However, prior to the efforts of the Fédération in 1969 and 
1970, a doctor registered for practice in a province was eligible to 
write the Médical Council of Canada examinations. With the LMCC, 
he or she might then apply to another province for registration. This 
was an embarrassment to some because ail the provinces wished to 
accept the Médical Council's examinations as a Dominion licensing 
examination, yet some of the licentiates did not fulfil ail the pro-
vinces' requirements for such things as internship or residency train-
ing.9 
The difficulties appear to relate to the problem of maintaining the dis-
criminatory practices once physicians hâve become landed immigrants 
or citizens of Canada.10 As our later analysis will show, some immigrant 
doctors manage to overcome the discriminatory practices, initially set-
tling in provinces with easy licensing requirements, and later moving to 
provinces with difficult entry requirements. In gênerai, the interprovincial 
migration of foreign trained doctors in Canada appears to be substan-
tially, affected by the licensing requirements across the country. 
PROVINCIAL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 
Assessing différences among provinces concerning licensing régula-
tions is difficult because much of the régulation is informai. In the final 
analysis an immigrant doctor may find his contacts with Canadian mé-
dical practitioners and his économie philosophy of as much importance 
9 W.G. McCLURE, « Physician Licensing Requirements : How the FPMLA 
is striving for uniformity in Canada, » Canadian Médical Association Journal, 
vol. 106, April 22, 1972, p. 922. 
10
 Or perhaps it is more to the point to suggest that there are difficulties in 
maintaining the discriminatory policies once the immigrants hâve become members 
of Canadian médical associations. 
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in determining his acceptability as his formai médical training. n The 
publication, Canadian Occupations Entry Requirements, Physicians and 
Surgeons — CCDO Unit Group 3111, ends its discussion of licensing 
requirements with the following comment : 
It should be noted that this assessment of qualifications does not 
confer the right to practice. Further, the granting of registration and, 
particularly, the granting of an Enabling Certificate to set the examin-
ation of the Médical Council of Canada rests with the provincial reg-
ulating body.12 
Formai licensing requirements appear to be the visible tip of the iceberg. 
Of necessity it must be assumed that informai and formai licensing re-
quirements are correlated concerning stringency to obtain some notion 
about différences in effective licensing procédures. 
Licensing requirements for Canadian trained doctors hâve been 
highly standardized among the provinces, at least partly to facilitate the 
provincial médical associations discussing and implementing policies of 
mutual financial and professional interest. In each province a candidate 
must hâve his degree and one year of internship in an approved hospital. 
In most provinces graduâtes of médical schools must register with the 
Médical Council of Canada. Often the Médical Council exams, required 
to become a Licentiate of the Council (LMCC), are integrated into the 
training programs of the médical schools. Since Canadian trained phy-
sicians ail hâve similar formai qualifications they are able to move among 
the provinces relatively easily.13 
11
 Médical associations continually discuss the need to evaluate the integrity, 
good character, and good professional conduct of potential practitioners but are 
quite unclear as to what this means. It is known that doctors with « socialistic in-
clinations» hâve increased difficulties in practicing medicine in Canada. See Mr. 
Justine Mervyn WOODS, The Report of the Honourable Mr. Justice Mervyn Woods 
on Hospital Staff Appointments, Regina, Saskatchewan, 1963. It is reasonable to 
assume that this also has a bearing on the licensing of immigrant doctors. 
12
 Department of Manpower and Immigration, Canadian Occupations Entry 
Requirements, Physicians and Surgeons — CCDO Unit Group 3111, Ottawa (Ca-
talogue No. ER31/12), p. 6. 
It might be noted that Dr. W.G. McCLURE, op. cit., ends his article with a 
comment in the same vein. 
13
 Movement between Québec and the rest of Canada is more difficult than 
other interprovincial movement because of the language problem. Québec requires 
graduâtes from outside the province to be proficient in French. Canadian Occupa-
tions Entry Requirements, op. cit., p. 3. 
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Licensing requirements for immigrant doctors hâve some similarities 
among the provinces. With the exception of Québec, ail the provinces 
prefer médical graduâtes from the United Kingdom, Eire, South Africa, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. They are preferred, or 
Category I, candidates because they corne from countries with common 
cultural backgrounds to Canada and comparable standards in the train-
ing of doctors. Other, or Category II, candidates are graduâtes of ail 
other médical schools listed by the World Health Organization. Licens-
ing requirements are always more stringent for Category II candidates 
than for Category I candidates. 
But the requirements for Category I candidates vary considerably 
among the provinces. Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta hâve had reciprocal agreements 
with the General Médical Council of Great Britain whereby British doc-
tors can practice in thèse provinces without any examination. Other Cate-
gory I candidates are required by thèse provinces to pass the LMCC 
exams before being allowed to practice. New Brunswick's requirements 
are comparable to those just described. While it requires ail Category I 
candidates to obtain the LMCC it grants intérim licenses to British doc-
tors awaiting examination. The intérim licenses facilitate setting up prac-
tice considerably because they allow candidates to work while waiting to 
write the exams (which are scheduled only once a year) and because 
they give candidates ample time to assess the nature of the exams. Effec-
tively, the Atlantic and Prairie Provinces can be defined as « easy en-
try > provinces for immigrant physicians. In contrast Ontario, British 
Columbia and Québec are « difficult entry » provinces. None of thèse 
provinces has had a reciprocal agreement with any foreign country and 
each requires Category I candidates to pass the LMCC exams before 
being allowed to practice. The major différences among them concern 
their requirements for the Enabling Certificate — which the candidate 
must hâve before he can sit the exams. In Ontario a Category I candi-
date must show that he is licensed to practice in his home country while 
in British Columbia he must show that he has completed twelve months 
of rotating internship in a hospital approved by the provincial Collège 
of Physicians and Surgeons. Québec grants the Enabling Certificate only 
to American graduâtes who hâve completed one year of internship in an 
approved hospital. Ail other Category I candidates must spend two years 
of internship in a Québec hospital to obtain the Certificate. Clearly, 
Quebec's licensing requirements are more restrictive than those of On-
tario and British Columbia. 
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In gênerai, the reciprocal agreements entered into by six of the pro-
vinces facilitate entry to the market by immigrant physicians consider-
ably. In a Brief to the Committee on the Healing Arts the Ontario Col-
lège of Physicians and Surgeons indicated that Nova Scotia's reciprocity 
agreement led to the licensing of physicians which « our collège would 
judge to be inferior. » 14 
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
The licensing requirements concerning foreign physicians are im-
portant economically because immigrant doctors constitute approximately 
half of Canada's annual increase in number of doctors.15 Of the immi-
grant doctors about half corne from the British Mes.16 Policies which 
affect the inflow of doctors, particularly from Great Britain, therefore 
hâve a significant impact on Canada's supply of physicians. 
Of course, not ail provinces hâve the same relative demand for 
immigrant doctors. Each province's demand dépend upon its own pro-
duction of doctors and upon its propensity to attract doctors from, or 
lose doctors to, other parts of Canada. Provinces which produce a large 
number of doctors and/or which hâve attractive living conditions will 
hâve the least need, relatively, for immigrant physicians. 
Producing ones own doctors appears to be a particularly effective 
way of eliminating the need for immigrant physicians since Canadian 
born physicians hâve a high propensity to remain in the région of birth 
and médical training. Professor Judek found that 87.9 percent of report-
ing Canadian born physicians in the Atlantic Provinces in 1962 had 
lived in the région before entering médical school and had remained 
there during their careers as doctors.17 The respective figures were 86.4 
percent for Québec, 81.8 percent for Ontario, 77.4 percent for the Prairie 
Provinces and 38.8 percent for British Columbia.18 
14
 J.W. GROVE, Organized Medicine in Ontario, A Study for the Committee 
on the Healing Arts, Toronto, 1969, pp. 141-142. 
15
 In 1970 there were 1,054 new graduâtes from Canadian médical schools 
and 1,113 immigrant doctors. In 1971 the respective numbers were 1,131 and 987. 
Health and Welfare Canada, Canada Health Manpower Inventory 1972, Ottawa, 
1972, p. 63. 
16
 Stanislaw JUDEK, Médical Manpower in Canada, Royal Commission on 
Health Services, Ottawa, 1964, p. 39. 
17 lbid., p. 191. 
18 lbid. 
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The propensity of Québec trained physicians to remain in Québec 
and the large number of physicians trained in that province helps to ex-
plain why it has set up such severe licensing standards for foreign phy-
sicians. In 1971 the ratio of M.D.'s granted by Québec universities to 
the increase in number of practicing physicians was 134 percent..19 Que-
bec produces enough doctors to export them to other parts of Canada 
and to the rest of the world. 20 Under thèse circumstances the Québec 
médical profession is little interested in having an inflow of immigrant 
physicians to « glut the market. » 
Other than Québec no province produces enough physicians to be 
self-sufficient. The ratio of M.D.'s granted to increase in number of 
practicing physicians in 1971 was 59 percent for Ontario, 40 percent for 
British Columbia, 65 percent for the Atlantic Provinces and 89 percent 
for the Prairies. 21 Interestingly enough, the « difficult entry » provinces 
are less self-sufficient than the « easy entry » provinces. Their stringent 
licensing requirements reflect not their domestic output of M.D.'s as 
much as their propensity to attract practicing physicians from the « easy 
entry » provinces. In turn, the Atlantic Provinces and Prairies must im-
port physicians from outside Canada. 
That Ontario and British Columbia should appear relatively at-
tractive to physicians is not surprising. They are the highest income pro-
vinces in Canada and the most urbanized. 22 
Furthermore, for many people, they hâve the most congenial climatic 
conditions. For thèse reasons they attract not only physicians from the 
other provinces but also most other kinds of workers. 
19
 Canada Health Manpower Inventory 1972, op. cit., pp. 61, 69. 
2 0
 McGill accounts for most of the export of doctors from Québec. Laval, 
Sherbrooke and Montréal, which train about 70 percent of the M.D.'s trained in 
Québec, get more of their students from the province and train them in the ex-
pectation that they will practice there. Médical Manpower in Canada, op. cit., p. 70. 
21
 Canada Health Manpower Inventory 1972, op. cit. 
2 2
 Personal income per capita in 1971 was $3,960 in Ontario, $3,713 in Bri-
tish Columbia, $3,403 in Alberta, $3,200 in Manitoba, $3,025 in Québec, $2,775 
in Saskatchewan, $2,608 in Nova Scotia, $2,469 in New Brunswick, $2,207 in New-
foundland and $2,188 in Prince Edward Island. 
In 1970 British Columbia had 59.4 percent of its population in urban centers 
over 100,000 in size, Ontario had 59.4 percent, Manitoba had 53.1 percent, Québec 
had 52.4 percent, Alberta had 51.6 percent, Saskatchewan had 26.0 percent and 
the Atlantic Provinces had 21.6 percent. 
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Because of the interprovincial migration of physicians Ontario and 
British Columbia, along with Québec, hâve fewer résidents per physician 
than any other province. In 1970 British Columbia had 613 résidents 
per active physician while Ontario had 637 and Québec had 681. 23 The 
« easy entry » provinces ail had more. Manitoba had 702, Alberta had 
707, Nova Scotia had 758, Saskatchewan had 817, New Brunswick had 
1,104, Newfoundland had 1,109 and Prince Edward Island had 1,134. M 
Ontario, British Columbia and Québec hâve stringent licensing require-
ments for immigrant physicians because, compared to the other provinces, 
they hâve an abundant supply of doctors . 
The more stringent licensing standards of Ontario, British Columbia 
and Québec may also exist because the potential for monopoly gain is 
greater. The expenditure on personal health care as a percent of Per-
sonal income is lower in thèse provinces than in most others. In 1970 
the ratio was 6.17 percent for British Columbia, 6.37 percent for On-
tario, 6.77 percent for Manitoba, 6.88 percent for Québec, 7.05 percent 
for Alberta and New Brunswick, 7.08 percent for Prince Edward Island, 
7.40 percent for Nova Scotia, 7.51 percent for Saskatchewan and 7.64 
percent for Newfoundland. 25 Assuming the price elasticity of demand 
for health care varies positively with the percent of income allocated to 
thèse services, the « difficult entry » provinces allow the médical asso-
ciations more benefit from raising priées than do most of the other pro-
vinces. 26 
The data suggest that the « easy entry » provinces are not a homo-
geneous group anymore than are the « difficult entry » provinces. In par-
ticular, Alberta and Manitoba differ significantly from Saskatchewan 
and the Atlantic Provinces. They hâve higher incomes per capita, they 
are more urbanized, they hâve lower population to doctor ratios and 
they spend smaller percents of their incomes on personal health care. 
The above considérations and the data on interprovincial migration 
of practicing physicians (Table 1) suggest the following groupings of 
2 3
 Canada Health Manpower lnventory 1972, op. cit., p. 62. 
24 ibid. 
25 Health and Welfare Canada, Expenditure on Personal Health Care in Ca-
nada, 1960-1971, Ottawa, 1972, pp. 10-19. 
26 For the argument to be valid under the medicare System it would hâve to 
be assumed that the provinces resist price increases, in a variety of ways, more 
vigorously as the percent of national output allocated to health care increases. 
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Canadian provinces. Québec (I), a net exporter of practicing physicians 
to ail other parts of Canada, is the most « difficult entry » province for 
immigrant physicians. Ontario and British Columbia (II), net importers 
of practicing physicians from ail other parts of Canada, are « difficult 
entry » provinces for immigrant physicians. Manitoba and Alberta (III), 
net importers of practicing physicians from Québec, Saskatchewan and 
the Atlantic Provinces but net exporters to Ontario and British Colum-
bia, are « easy entry » provinces, at least partly because their exports 
exceed their imports. Finally, Saskatchewan and the Atlantic Provinces 
(IV), net exporters of practicing physicians to ail other parts of Canada 
except Québec, are « easy entry » provinces that hâve the greatest need 
for immigrant physicians. Thèse groupings will be used in subséquent 
analysis. 
TABLE 1 
Net Migrations of Practicing Physicians, 
January 1 , 1970 to December 30, 1972 
Outflow 
Inflow / II III IV Total 
I 0 297 23 50 370 
II - 2 9 7 0 - 1 4 0 - 1 5 4 - 5 9 1 
III - 2 3 140 0 - 3 6 81 
IV - 5 0 154 36 0 140 
Total - 3 7 0 591 - 8 1 - 1 4 0 0 
SOURCE : Health and Welfare Canada, Year to Year Mobility of Physicians Rési-
dent in ^Canada by Activity Status and Province of Résidence, 1969-1972, 
Ottawa, 1973. 
LICENSING AND MIGRATION OF FOREIGN TRAINED DOCTORS 
The provincial licensing régulations hâve affected the migration of 
immigrant physicians to Canada. In gênerai, the less stringent the li-
censing requirements the more immigrant physicians relative to other 
immigrants a province gets (Table 2). Thus Ontario and British Colum-
bia get relatively small inflows of immigrant physicians while Manitoba, 
the Atlantic Provinces and Saskatchewan get relatively large inflows. 
Québec and Alberta are exceptions to this tendency (Table 2) but the 
former province's situation is easily explained. Québec is the only low 
income and French speaking « difficult entry > province. Thus it attracts 
relatively fewer immigrants of ail kinds than does Ontario or British Co-
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lumbia. 27 In effect, while physician inflows are small for the province 
so are other immigrant inflows. The relatively small inflows of immigrant 
physicians to Alberta is the only migration pattern specified in Table 2 
that is difficult to explain. Our previous analysis would lead us to predict 
that Alberta's relative inflow of immigrant physicians would be com-
parable to Manitoba's, although this is clearly not the case. 28 
TABLE 2 
Immigration to Canada by Province 
(Per Cent) 
of Destination, 1972 
Province Physicians Total Immigration Différence 







- 7 . 4 








- 0 . 3 








Total 100.0 100.0 0.0 
SOURCE : Manpower and Immigration, 1972 Immigration Statistics, Information 
Canada, Ottawa, 1974, Catalogue No. MP22-1/1972, pp. 8-9. 
To be effective the licensing régulations must affect not only the 
destinations of immigrant physicians but also their subséquent move-
ments. Table 3 indicates that they hâve, in some measure, been successful 
in achieving this latter objective. Areas III and IV import from the rest 
of Canada relatively more foreign trained physicians than Canadian 
trained physicians, the situation being more accentuated for IV than for 
III. 29 On the other hand, I and II import relatively fewer foreign trained 
physicians, the situation being more accentuated for I than for IL The 
27
 In 1972 Quebec's immigration as a percent of its population was 0.31. The 
respective rates for Ontario and British Columbia were 0.82 and 0.90. 
28
 In 1972 Alberta's immigration as a percent of its population was 0.51 
while Manitoba's immigration was 0.53. In contrast, Saskatchewan's immigration 
was 0.17 percent and the Atlantic Provinces' was 0.19 percent. 
29
 Positive entries in Table 3, reading by column, implies a relatively larger 
gross inflow of foreign trained physicians than Canadian trained physicians. A 
négative entry implies the reverse. 
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proportion of foreign trained doctors migrating to an area déclines as the 
licensing standards become more stringent.30 
TABLE 3 
Variation in Migration Pattern Between Foreign Trained Physicians 
and Canadian Trained Physicians in Canada 
January 1, 1970 to December 30, 1972 (Per Cent) 
Inflow 
Outflow 
I II III IV Total 
I 0.00 - 1 1 . 4 6 * - 0 . 9 1 - 0 . 7 7 - 1 3 . 1 4 
II - 4 . 9 4 0.00 - 1 . 7 5 3.42 - 3 . 2 7 
III - 0 . 1 6 - 5 . 3 7 0.00 3.80 - 1 . 7 2 
IV 0.24 14.07 3.82 0.00 18.14 
Total - 4 . 8 6 - 2 . 7 6 1.16 6.46 0.00 
SOURCE : Health and Welfare Canada, Year to Year Mobility of Physicians Rési-
dent in Canada by Activity Status and Province of Résidence, 1969-1972. 
Ottawa, 1973. 
* From 1970 to 1972 14.68 percent of the total inter-area migration of foreign 
trained practicing physicians was from I to II. The respective figure for Canadian 
trained physicians is 26.14. The différence is —11.46. 
Not only is it difficult for foreign trained physicians to enter Québec, 
Ontario and British Columbia but it is also difficult for them to move 
among thèse provinces. Interprovincial migration between any two of 
thèse provinces is always relatively smaller for foreign trained physicians 
than it is for Canadian trained physicians.31 
The data on gross outward migrations of physicians (the rows in 
Table III) bear on the licensing issue as well, although not as directly 
as the data on inward migration. The propensity of foreign trained phy-
sicians to leave an area relative to that of Canadian trained physicians 
varies inversely with the stringency of the licensing restrictions of the 
30
 From 1970 to 1972 the gross inflow of foreign trained physicians as a per-
cent of inflow of ail physicians from the other 3 areas was 33.67 for I, 40.16 for 
II, 43.02 for III and 47.48 for IV. 
31
 This observation is documented in a gênerai way by the négative entries 
between I and II in Table 3. It can be documented in greater détail by developing 
a Table in which ail 10 provinces are specified separately. 
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area. This would be consistent with the following explanation. Foreign 
trained doctors in the « easy entry » provinces are often there because of 
expediency. They therefore move often and into the « difficult entry » 
provinces whenever they are able to. In contrast, foreign doctors in the 
« difficult entry » provinces cannot move easily within the area and do 
not want to migrate to the « easy entry » provinces. They therefore move 
across provincial boundaries relatively little. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
In one sensé the results of this paper are easy to summarize. The 
médical profession has implemented licensing régulations designed to 
affect the provincial location of foreign trained physicians. They hâve 
induced a large number of immigrant physicians to locate, and remain, 
in the Atlantic Provinces and in the Prairie Provinces, thus helping to 
alleviate the doctor shortages in thèse areas. 
Of course, the licensing policy has not completely restricted the 
movement of foreign trained practicing physicians in Canada. From 1970 
to 1972 Ontario gained, on net, 128 foreign trained physicians from other 
provinces, constituting 5.8 percent of its original supply.32 Similarly, 
British Columbia gained 10.9 percent.33 In contrast, the « easy entry » 
provinces lost foreign trained physicians. Over the three year period the 
Atlantic Provinces lost, on net, 3.9 percent of its foreign trained practicing 
physicians, Manitoba lost 3.7 percent and Saskatchewan lost 20.4 per-
cent. 34 The leakage of foreign trained physicians from the Atlantic Pro-
vinces and the Prairies to Ontario and British Columbia accounts for 
the médical profession's continued interest in licensing régulations con-
cerning foreign doctors. Recently the provincial médical association 
hâve been able to agrée that provincial registration will no longer carry 
with it the right to take the exams of the Médical Council of Canada.35 
The effect of this agreement is to restrict even more the interprovincial 
movement of foreign trained practicing physicians. 
3 2
 Health and Welfare Canada, Year to Year Mobility of Physicians Résident 




35 W.G. McCLURE, « Physician Licensing Requirements : How the FPMLA 
is striving for uniformity in Canada, » op. cit., p. 922. 
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The implications of the licensing régulations are not so easy to sum-
marize. Given présent institutional arrangements they undoubtedly lead 
to a better géographie distribution of doctors than would a situation 
where ail provinces adopt similar licensing régulations. However, they 
do not get at the basic problem, which is one of inadéquate numbers of 
doctors in rural areas. Currently, only Ontario and British Columbia 
appear to hâve sufficient numbers of full time physicians36 serving the 
population outside centers of 100,000 or more (which we will define as 
rural).3 7 As of 1970 Ontario had 1 physician for every 1,109 urban rési-
dents and 1 physician for every 1,135 rural résidents.38 The respective 
numbers for British Columbia were 837 and 1,301.39 While the other 
provinces had adéquate numbers of physicians for their urban résidents 
(compared to Ontario) they did not hâve adéquate numbers for their 
rural résidents. The Atlantic Provinces had 1 doctor to 1,036 résidents 
in urban centers but only 1 doctor to 2,062 résidents in rural centers. 40 
Respective numbers for Québec were 1,284 and 1,926, for Manitoba 
they were 1,025 and 2,000, for Saskatchewan they were 871 and 2,252 
and for Alberta they were 952 and 1,663. 41 In most parts of Canada 
rural areas hâve over 1,500 résidents per active physician, and this despite 
the discriminatory licensing practices which currently exist for foreign 
physicians. 42 
The problem of inadéquate numbers of physicians in rural areas will 
only be resolved if it is tackled more directly than through provincial li-
censing régulations. Two obvious ways of dealing with the problem corne 
to mind. The first would be to manipulate the fee schedule such that 
physicians in urban areas get paid less than those in rural areas. 43 The 
36
 A full time physician is defined as one who makes $15,000 or more in a 
year from his fees-for-service. 
37 Admittedly, the définition of rural is inadéquate since towns between 5,000 
and 100,000 in size do not hâve the same difficultés attracting doctors as do areas 
that are truly rural. The définition is dépendent on data availability. 
38
 Health and Welfare Canada, Earnings of Physicians in ^Canada, 1960-1970, 




42 Of course, it must be remembered that the médical profession has never 
maintained that its licensing régulations are for the purpose of affecting the géo-
graphie distribution of physicians. 
43
 Not only a two price system, but a three price or four price system, or more 
could be considered if économie conditions warranted it. 
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second would be to implement a clinic System, something like that des-
cribed in the Hastings Report or the Castonguay-Nepveu Report. M The 
clinic system would automatically establish the number of physician posi-
tion in each area. The clinics would then hâve to fill thèse positions, per-
haps by bidding against each other for physicians in the job market. But 
the choice of method is beyond the scope of this paper since it would 
dépend on the complète set of goals that are specified for health policy. 
Quelques effets des règlements sur la pratique de la médecine 
dans la répartition des praticiens au Canada 
Les économistes sont d'accord pour reconnaître que, dans la plupart des pays 
capitalistes, la profession médicale a agi de manière à exercer un monopole sur 
les marchés des services médicaux. D'une façon ou d'une autre, les membres de 
la profession ont cherché à limiter le nombre des praticiens en contrôlant les con-
ditions et les règlements d'accessibilité à l'exercice de la médecine. 
Le contrôle de l'autorisation de pratiquer peut revêtir plusieurs formes dont 
on peut retenir les trois suivantes. Une des méthodes favorites pour y arriver 
consiste à exiger des candidats un niveau de formation exagéré, ce qui a pour effet 
d'assurer aux praticiens une valorisation accrue de leurs brevets, d'empêcher les 
aspirants d'accéder à la pratique et de se tailler une clientèle. La deuxième mé-
thode vise à doser la sévérité des examens en fonction des besoins. Enfin, par une 
troisième méthode, on discriminera les sujets étrangers par rapport aux autochtones, 
ce qui se défend assez bien auprès de l'opinion publique. 
La profession médicale canadienne a eu tendance à recourir à la première 
et à la troisième méthode plutôt qu'à la seconde. 
Depuis l'après-guerre, on s'est montré de plus en plus exigeant relativement 
à la formation scolaire des candidats à l'étude de la médecine. On a resserré les 
exigences requises des médecins immigrés, même si elles ne sont pas homogènes 
d'un bout à l'autre du pays. À cause de conditions économiques différentes, les 
associations provinciales de médecins n'ont pas pu s'entendre sur les critères des-
tinés à évaluer les médecins immigrés. Par exemple, si on appliquait à Terre-
Neuve les normes du Collège des médecins de l'Ontario, il s'ensuivrait une grave 
pénurie de médecins dans la province insulaire et d'immenses régions de la pro-
vince seraient privées de praticiens. Conséquemment, les exigences sont moindres 
à Terre-Neuve. 
Les variations de ces normes constituent une source d'embêtements pour la 
profession médicale. Certains médecins immigrés s'arrangent pour contourner ces 
4 4
 « Report of the Community Health Centre Project to the Conférence of 
Health Ministers », Ottawa, 1972. « Report of the Commission of Inquiry on 
Health and Social Welfare », vol. 14, Health, Québec. 1970. 
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pratiques discriminatoires. Il s'installent d'abord dans les provinces où les exigences 
sont moindres et déménagent ensuite là où les règlements sont plus rigoureux. 
Il est difficile de se faire une idée exacte des différences qui existent dans les 
normes parce que celles-ci revêtent souvent un caractère informel, la réglemen-
tation ne représentant que la pointe de l'iceberg. La conception que le médecin 
immigré se fait de la vie médicale pèse autant sinon plus que sa formation profes-
sionnelle. Il est certain que les médecins à tendance socialiste ont plus de diffi-
cultés que les autres à se faire admettre à la pratique. 
Les conditions requises pour obtenir l'autorisation de pratiquer ont été uni-
formisées de façon à faciliter la mise en place de politiques d'intérêt profession-
nel. Dans chacune des provinces l'aspirant doit détenir une licence en médecine et 
avoir fait une année d'internat dans un hôpital agréé. De même, les écoles de mé-
decine doivent être agréées par le Conseil médical du Canada. Par conséquent, 
étant donné que les médecins formés au Canada possèdent des qualifications simi-
laires, ils peuvent facilement passer d'une province à l'autre. 
Les exigences requises des médecins immigrés sont à peu près les mêmes dans 
les différentes provinces et, à l'exception du Québec, toutes les provinces préfèrent 
les médecins originaires du Royaume-Uni, de l'Irlande, de l'Afrique du Sud, de 
l'Australie, de la Nouvelle-Zélande et des États-Unis. La rigueur des exigences 
varie considérablement selon les provinces mais c'est au Québec que les restrictions 
sont le plus marquées. 
Dans un autre ordre d'idées, les conditions exigées des médecins étrangers ont 
des conséquences économiques importantes parce que ceux-ci comptent pour à peu 
près la moitié dans l'augmentation du nombre de praticiens au Canada, et c'est la 
Grande-Bretagne qui fournit cinquante pour cent de cet effectif. Par ailleurs, la 
demande n'est pas répartie également entre les provinces. Tout dépend du nombre 
de sujets que les écoles de médecine sont en mesure de former. Les provinces les 
mieux nanties et celles qui peuvent assurer un meilleur niveau de vie aux praticiens 
ont un moindre besoin de médecins immigrés. Ainsi, en 1962, dans les provinces 
de l'Atlantique, 87.9 pour cent des médecins autochtones avaient vécu dans la 
région avant de s'inscrire en médecine et y faisaient carrière. Dans les autres 
provinces, le pourcentage était de 86.4 au Québec, de 81.8 en Ontario, de 77.4 
dans les Prairies et de 38.8 en Colombie Britannique. La tendance des médecins 
du Québec à y demeurer et la grande quantité des médecins qui y sont formés 
expliquent que les conditions d'accessibilité à la pratique des médecins étrangers 
y soient plus strictes. En fait, le Québec exporte des médecins. Il n'en est pas 
ainsi dans le reste du pays. L'Ontario et la Colombie attirent les médecins parce 
que les revenus y sont plus élevés, que l'urbanisation est plus avancée, que les con-
ditions climatiques sont moins rigoureuses. C'est pourquoi elles n'attirent pas que 
les médecins des autres provinces, mais aussi d'autres catégories de travailleurs. 
À cause de la migration d'une province à l'autre, l'Ontario, la Colombie Bri-
tannique et le Québec ont moins d'habitants par médecin que les autres provinces. 
Pour la Colombie Britannique, l'Ontario et le Québec, les chiffres étaient respec-
tivement de 613, 637 et 681, tandis que le nombre grimpe à 702 au Manitoba, 
707 en Alberta, 758 en Nouvelle-Ecosse, 817 en Saskatchewan, 1,104 au Nouveau-
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Brunswick, 1,109 à Terre-Neuve et 1,134 dans l'Ile du Prince-Edouard. Ainsi, 
comparée à ces dernières provinces, les règlements relatifs à l'autorisation de pra-
tiquer sont-ils plus rigoureux au Québec, en Ontario et en Colombie Britannique. 
Par ailleurs, étant donné que l'élasticité des prix pour la demande des soins 
médicaux varie suivant le pourcentage du revenu qui leur est consacré, il est possi-
ble que les médecins des provinces où les normes sont plus sévères veuillent ainsi 
tirer avantage des hausses de prix. De fait, le pourcentage du revenu consacré 
aux services médicaux est, plus bas qu'ailleurs en Colombie, en Ontario, au Mani-
toba et au Québec. 
En résumé, on peut noter ceci : le Québec qui est la province qui fournit le 
plus de médecins ailleurs au Canada, est celle qui freine le plus l'entrée des mé-
decins immigrants ; l'Ontario et la Colombie Britannique qui importent des mé-
decins des autres parties du Canada ont aussi une réglementation rigoureuse. Le 
Manitoba et l'Alberta qui reçoivent des praticiens du Québec, de la Saskatchewan 
et des provinces de l'Atlantique et dont les conditions d'admission à la pratique 
sont plus souples, voient leurs médecins immigrer en Ontario et en Colombie Bri-
tannique. Enfin, les médecins de la Saskatchewan et des provinces de l'Atlan-
tique, provinces où les règlements d'admission sont conciliants, vont s'établir par-
tout au Canada à l'exception du Québec. 
De ce qui précède, force est de conclure que les règlements d'accessibilité à la 
pratique exercent une influence sur la migration d'une province à l'autre au Canada 
des médecins étrangers. Pour être efficace, la réglementation devrait non seule-
ment porter sur la destination des médecins immigrants mais aussi sur leurs dépla-
cements ultérieurs. En conséquence, non seulement est-il difficile pour les médecins 
étrangers de s'établir au Québec, en Ontario et en Colombie Britannique, mais il 
leur est aussi difficile de passer de l'une de ces provinces à l'autre. 
Les conclusions de cette étude sont faciles à tirer. La profession médicale a 
mis en oeuvre des règlements qui ont une influence sur l'établissement des méde-
cins immigrants. Ils ont incité beaucoup de ceux-ci à se fixer dans les provinces des 
Prairies et de l'Atlantique contribuant ainsi à alléger la pénurie de praticiens dans 
ces régions. La réglementation actuelle a permis d'assurer une meilleure répartition 
géographique des médecins, mais elle n'a pas réglé le problème du manque de mé-
decins dans les campagnes. L'Ontario et la Colombie Britannique ont un nombre 
suffisant de praticiens dans les régions rurales alors que, dans les autres provinces, 
s'il y en a assez dans les villes, la situation est tout autre dans les campagnes. Aussi, 
le problème de la pénurie de médecins en milieu rural ne peut être réglé que par 
l'établissement de taux de rémunération supérieurs dans les campagnes ou par la 
mise en oeuvre d'une recommandation des rapports Hastings ou Castonguay-Nep-
veu qui consisterait à fixer le nombre de médecins pour chaque région. 
